Dynamics of Life-Course Transitions: A Methodological Reflection by Zittoun, Tania
The French movie “Life Is a Long Quiet River” (« La vie est un long fleuve tran-
quille », Chatiliez, 1988) compares the fates of two children, born in contrasting 
social classes and exchanged at birth, and plays with the unpredictable curves and 
bends of their developmental histories, which eventually bring them to acquire the 
skills and knowledge that they might have acquired in their original milieu. The 
ironic title strongly suggests that life is not a long quite river, and illustrates two 
long-time known principles of development. It shows that the development of a 
child or a person is not linear, and cannot be predicted; it also shows that many dif-
ferent ways can lead a person to develop a given skill or understanding (Vygotsky, 
1929/1993). Admitting these principles has consequences for the study of human 
development: life-courses appear characterized not only by the regular and pro-
gressive establishment of regularities and continuities, but also, and mainly, by the 
moments in which these continuities are interrupted, reoriented, or challenged.
Such moments are interesting for several reasons. Firstly, at a theoretical level, 
it is at points of bifurcation that the person or the organism has to develop new con-
duct. Secondly, at an empirical level, lives in contemporary societies are exposing 
people to interruptions to what appears continuous to them—for example through 
job reassignments, demands to engage in continuous education, changes in family 
composition, the introduction of new technologies at home or in the workplace, 
and so on and so forth. Thirdly, at a methodological level, these points constitute 
“natural change laboratories” in people’s lives. In effect, experimental settings 
usually create tasks or strange situations to which people have to answer; in these 
situations, researchers examine people’s answers or the processes that lead them to 
these. Ruptures in life produce equivalent tasks, or strange situations, calling for an 
answer—and thus processes whereby these answers, or adjustment are produced, 
can be observed; I call them here transitions.
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My main proposition is that the couple of notions “rupture” and “transition” 
offers a powerful methodological unit of analysis for the study of development in 
life trajectories. I emphasize the heuristic power and the relevance of such unit of 
analysis, the difficulties it raises, and some strategies to circumvent these. I finally 
suggest how the notions might be used to develop a rich understanding of changes 
in life-trajectories.
Studying Development
The reflection on the study of life-trajectory proposed here belongs to a certain ori-
entation within developmental psychology; I present here four of its assumptions, 
for they raise some methodological difficulties that will have to be addressed.
Firstly, the study of development is the study of processes whereby change occurs. 
This might seem obvious; however, many studies which might appear developmen-
tal do not examine processes. For example, measuring a person’s ability to answer 
to a test at time X, and measuring the same person’s ability a time X + n, enables to 
compare two results at two points in time. One might see that this enables to identify 
some developmental change of the person’s abilities between X and X + n. However, 
such comparison does not say anything about the process by which the person pro-
ducing a result at time X has becomes the person producing a result at time X + n. A 
comparison of X and X + n is a comparison of outcomes, not of processes. In contrast 
the process of changes can be examined (Valsiner, 2007). This does not mean that 
the person has to be totally changing all the time. Describing development requires 
to account both for the continuity and the changes in which a developing organism, 
person or system is necessarily engaged (Erikson, 1968; James, 1890).
Secondly, the development of a person is a complex phenomenon, involving 
biological, psychological, but also interpersonal and social processes. The approach 
chosen here considers as central the “social” or “cultural” nature of human conduct. 
The social or cultural component of psychological processes can be observed at dif-
ferent levels of analysis. It can be observed at the level of intrapersonal phenomena 
(e.g., analyzing a person’s internal dialogues, as echoes of other social situations, 
Bakhtin, 1982; Markovà, 2003). It is obviously visible at the level of interpersonal 
processes (e.g., interactive dialogues, Grossen & Salazar Orvig, 2006), and at the 
level of intra-group or inter-groups dynamics. Finally, the social nature of human 
conduct can be observed when people deal with ideological phenomena at a societal 
level (e.g., the emergence of social representations in face of a new societal event) 
(Doise, 1982; Perret-Clermont, 2004). Although these levels of analysis are often 
separated due to methodological and conceptual reasons, in reality, changes identi-
fied at one level have actually consequences for phenomena observed at another 
level (Fogel, 2006; Fogel, King, & Shanker, 2008; Vasiner, 2007). Hence, a young 
man’s development can be observed at the level of the change his perception of 
himself (intrapersonal level of analysis) or at the level of his changing relation-
ships with girls (interpersonal); however there are good reasons to believe that both 
events are related. Or a country’s new policy against foreigners (societal level of 
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analysis) can bring people to deal very differently with their neighbors in everyday 
life (interpersonal level). Some authors thus speak of the interdependency between 
ontogenetic processes (the person’s development), micro-genesis (changes occur-
ring as interactions between the person and her social environment unfolds) and 
socio-genesis (changes in the social environment, whereby social representations 
develop) (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). In the case of the study of life-trajectories—
which are always unfolding in diverse contexts, and experience by a person through 
a longer period of time—change can only be explained by taking in account at least 
intra and interpersonal changes and their interactions (see e.g., Gillespie, 2005, on 
Malcolm X, or Zittoun, 2003, on Carl Rogers).
Thirdly, the perspective chosen here considers that the person, constantly inter-
acting with others and her environment, is also engaged in negotiating the meaning 
of these situations (Bruner, 1990). These processes of meaning making are rendered 
possible through diverse forms of semiotic mediation (Vygotsky, 1930). Processes 
of internalization, by which shared meanings become internalized, that is intra-psy-
chological, and externalization, when the latter find a sharable form in interpersonal 
situations, play a major role in such processes (see e.g., Valsiner & Rosa, 2007). 
Meaning making can only be observed via these processes. One cannot know what 
a person thinks about A; one can know in which circumstances the person has been 
exposed to A (i.e., the conditions of a possible internalization), and what she says or 
does about A (what she externalizes)—and it is only on this basis that the person’s 
thinking about A can be inferred.
Fourth, as any other science, developmental psychology aims at proposing gen-
eral understandings of some phenomena. It is obvious that describing the devel-
opment of one person in one circumstance is not enough. Yet there are different 
ways to construct general knowledge; I will here consider case studies. Case studies 
enable to account for the complexity of phenomena as identified above. How then 
to link and bring together different case studies? It is impossible to construct an 
“average” case; one would thus loose what makes the interest of a case. Rather, one 
can use a more formal language, and thus sketch a model of processes. This model 
can then be applied on another situation, and modified so as to account for its spe-
cificities, and to a third, and so on. A model hence developed enables to highlight 
relationships between significant components of situations. In turn, case-studies can 
be analyzed as exemplifying some variations of these relations (e.g., Branco, 2007; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006). In this paper, I clarify a set of notions which enable to identify 
some relationships occurring in great variety of cases. These notions can then be 
used to work towards generalized knowledge.
Methodological Difficulties
The history of psychology repeatedly shows how difficult these principles are to 
follow when it comes down to empirical research. The major difficulty is to capture 
the time-dimension, that is, the processual nature of the phenomenon under study. 
Indeed, any form of description of a phenomenon requires stepping out of time. Data 
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collection always requires decomposing the flow of time into units so as to keep a 
semiotic trace of a given phenomenon, through different techniques: pictures, films, 
paper–pen, etc. This is even stronger when the persons’ perspectives are questioned 
in real-time: they then have to comment on their actions or to write some notes 
about their current state of mind—and doing so they definitely take distance from 
the flow of time and experience. Also, change can take place in time-scales that are 
difficult to observe continuously (as a life-time) or with accuracy (as an emergent 
idea). Even analyzing data is a way of distancing from the flow of time: creating 
categories of events occurred in a classroom interaction looses their location in 
duration. Finally, it is very difficult to engage in a real-time enquiry without affect-
ing the phenomena itself. The second difficulty is that it is very difficult to observe 
more than one level of change in one single operation, such as micro-genesis and 
ontogenesis; usually, research chooses to focus on one level, and then misses impor-
tant aspects of change. Thirdly, it is easier to observe externalization than to capture 
internalization; and it is simpler to capture it, when it is verbal. Consequently, many 
studies focus exclusively on verbal interactions when interested in psychological 
change, hence loosing the perspective of the person. Fourthly, simplifications in 
view of generalisation often intervene early in the study; as richness of the data is 
lost, further theorization and identification of theoretical equivalences with other 
cases is often prevented (Overton, 2002; Wagoner, 2007, 2009).
The methodological reflection presented in this chapter is based on the four 
developmental assumptions presented above, and addresses these methodological 
difficulties. It examines how the notions of rupture and transition can be used to 
study life-trajectories. It thus pursues a reflection undertaken by me and groups of 
researchers in which I have been collaborating over the past 10 years. As we have 
been exploring a wide range of methodological strategies for the study of transi-
tions, empirical examples are primarily taken from our work. Other studies are also 
mentioned to expand or contrast our choices. In no sense this is a review of the 
literature on transitions.
Transitions to Approach Development
A powerful meta-theoretical frame for understanding life-trajectories is currently 
given by complex system theory. In rough lines, in such meta-theoretical frame, the 
development of an organism can be described as a constantly changing adjustment 
between the organism and its environment, going through a series of relatively sta-
ble periods, alternating with more important changes due to brutal ruptures within 
the adjustment process (van Geert, 2003; von Bertalanffy, 1993). These moments 
of ruptures, which can be facilitated or provoked by internal factors as well as by 
external ones, can be described as points of bifurcation, from which the organism 
can develop in one, or the other direction. This analysis can be applied to micro-
processes of change, such as the development of a cell, or at the ontogenetic level, 
such as the trajectory of an individual in his context. For example, the life of Jack 
4
London, as described in his autobiographical novel John Barleycorn published in 
1913 (London, 1998), is filled with such moments of bifurcation. As he was a child, 
his parents moved frequently; born in a farm, he arrived in town and was asked 
to sell newspapers in the street, aged ten. On the one hand, the autonomy he thus 
gained enabled him to explore the library and to read his first books—a revelation, 
which appears decisive for his future life (Sutherland, 1998, p. 214); on the other 
hand, being in the street and delivering newspapers, he also discovered the life of 
pubs. The rupture (of changing habitat) opened new pathways (commitment with 
books, relationship to alcohol), which have different consequences. London early 
engages in drinking, and risks to remain in that path; yet later incidents bring him 
to change pathway—such as for example, the love for an educated woman, which 
seems to have encouraged him to start adult education and to be accepted at col-
lege. Another example of significant bifurcation is reported by him: at a period in 
which he tried to live from his writing without succeeding, he was offered a stable 
position in the local post-office; he refused because the postmaster who offered him 
the job upset him (London, 1998, p. 145); forced to pursue writing, he started to be 
abundantly published soon after. Would he have accepted the stable job, it seems, 
he would not have become the author we know. Jack London thus faces many 
bifurcation points, and following one way will have unpredictable consequences. 
However, although a given option never comes back twice, alternative routes lead 
to equivalent points.
In an open system, two contrasting types of changes can be identified. A first 
type participates to the continuous, regular evolution of the system. These are part 
of transitive dynamics, or circular phenomena. For example, during the period in 
which Jack London is able to live from his writing, he sells a story, earns money, 
can pay his bills, and thus can spend all his mornings writing—and so can he write 
quality stories and sell them. In contrast, an intransitive change breaks such a circle: 
for example, at the end of this writing period, Jack London is challenged by a group 
of young men to participate to a drinking contest—unable to refuse, he drinks, and 
next day, is unable to write, and later, he fails to give a planned talk (London, 1998, 
pp. 151–153). Accepting the drinking contest constitutes a rupture in London’s 
forced sobriety at this time. This event constitutes a rupture of the “virtuous circle” 
of a given suite of phenomena; it necessary calls for a new arrangement in the sys-
tem; such a change can be called intransitive.
A rupture signs the end of a mode of adjustment; after such an event, the routine 
changes are invalidated; new dynamics have to be established. Trivially, think about 
book arrangements: for a while, every new book bought by a person finds a place 
in her bookshelf; at some point, one book comes, and the bookshelf is full. At this 
point, as the normal course of things is interrupted, the person might start to imagine 
what new furniture she will buy or build. Hence, a rupture is a call for new ideas, 
new solutions, or new ways of acting or thinking. If life always requires regular 
change, as in transitive processes, a rupture calls for more, deeper, more substantive 
changes; in that sense a rupture is a catalyst for intransitive change.
From a developmental perspective, such intransitive changes following ruptures 
are of greatest interest; this is where newness is called for, and can emerge. This 
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observation has to be translated in notions that have some heuristic power, that is, 
that enable us to account for actual observations, and that permit such observations 
and analysis to be connected to the existing developmental and learning literature.
The notion of transition offers an actionable notion to study these changes. At a 
theoretical level, it can be quite easily connected to these of rupture, or bifurcation. 
At an empirical level, there is a growing literature on transitions in the life-course 
(see Levy, Ghisletta, Le Goff, Spini, & Widmer, 2005, for a recent overview), 
which can then be discussed on this basis and integrated in a wider reflection on 
development.
The Notion of Transition
Transitions can be defined as processes of catalysed change due to a rupture, and 
aiming at a new sustainable fit between the person and her current environment. 
The notion of transition can be easily connected to other constructs in developmen-
tal psychology. This notion thus requires, as in any systemic approach, an initial 
rupture in the system constituted by the person and her environment, system that 
can be defined in different manners according to the chosen level of analysis. The 
notion of rupture designates the processes called irritation (Peirce, 1878), crisis 
(Vygotsky, 2004, 1930; Erikson, 1950/1995, 1968; James, 1890), desequilibration 
(Piaget, 1966/2003), challenge (Smelser, 1980), critical event (Wapner & Demick, 
2005) or turning point (Rutter, 1994) in psychology. The notion of transition des-
ignates the processes captured by these of re-equilibration subsequent to ruptures, 
of restoration of one’s sense of continuity and integrity (Carugati, 2004; Erikson, 
1968; James, 1892; Palmonari, 1993; for reviews see Elcheroth et al., 2003; van 
Geert, 1988; Wapner & Craig-Bray, 1992).
The notion of transition is preferred to competing notions for a few theoretical 
reasons. The powerful equilibration (Piaget, 1964/1967) notion has been devel-
oped to account for the development of intra-psychological, mental structures. 
In contrast, ruptures-transitions can more directly account for the adjustment 
between the person and her socio-cultural environment. The notion of crises and 
its resolution was proposed by Erikson to discuss key-points in life trajectories: 
a crisis would for him designate “a necessary turn, a crucial moment in develop-
ment, when it has to choose between ways in which are distributed the further 
resources of growth recovery and differentiation” (Erikson 1968/1972, p. 11, 
m.t.). However the notion was developed in a theoretical frame which considered 
a certain number of normative crises in a life-trajectory and strongly suggested 
which of their outcomes would be preferable. Also, it is now strongly associated 
to Erikson’s work on adolescence identity-crises. In contrast, processes of tran-
sitions can more easily be heard as leading to undetermined outcomes, are less 
specifically associated to a given period of the life-course, and are not limited to 
identity processes.
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From Static to Dynamic Understandings of Transitions
The notion of transition is useful only if it can account for transformations. The 
term transition of course suggests that something is being changed from one state to 
another, or from A to B. In the major part of the contemporary literature on transi-
tions, the authors start by defining the two contexts, stages or phases A and B. The 
term transition then designates the fact that B replaces A.
Having to account for phenomena that have a great social or educational rel-
evance, many authors have used the notion of transition as its common sense 
usefully designates the idea of the passage from A to B. There is thus a wide 
literature on the school-to-work transition, the transition from secondary school 
to university, the transition between work places, and so forth. Another family 
of studies is related to the study of the life-course. Here as well, the notion is 
often used to designate the move from one stage or one social role to another 
one, such as the transition to adulthood, parenthood, retirement, and so forth. 
The notion of transition is very appealing to designate these changes; however, 
its seductive appearance is rarely questioned. Yet it raises some issues: firstly, 
used in this way, it assumes that A and B are clearly identified. Secondly, if one 
does not question the processes involved in what bring A to transit towards B, the 
notion of designates the magical replacement of one state by another—B rather 
than A.
Three main criticisms can be addressed to approaches that use unreflectively 
the notion of transition. First, because of their focus on endpoints, they tend to 
leave the processes of change out of their investigation (among them, especially 
the studies that compare some data produced in B with some data produced in A). 
Second, identifying B-rather-than-A issues often brings to enquire about norma-
tive changes in a given social space or life-trajectory. Normative changes require 
some stability of the environment. However, at a social level, contemporary social 
spaces and trajectories are in rapid evolution; at the individual level, individual tra-
jectories tend to be non linear, individualized and going through frequent changes. 
In contemporary liberal societies, starting a job or studying, raising children or 
mating, can happen many times in a life trajectory, due to changes of the economi-
cal world, the technological environment, transformations of values and cultural 
exchanges (Perret-Clermont, Resnick, Pontecorvo, Zittoun, & Burge, 2004). An 
empirical priority is thus not to study stability and norms, but rather to examine 
changes and bifurcations in life trajectories. Thirdly, identifying and labeling one 
transition (e.g., school-to-work, to adulthood, etc.) easily hides the fact that, in 
a complex system, a change is usually accompanied by a whole series of related 
adjustments.
A contrasting approach to transitions considers that it is precisely the processes 
whereby A becomes B that are relevant. The focus is on A becoming B, on the mer-
gence of A into B, or on the emergence of B out of A. Of course, this can be done at 
various level of analysis—the micro-processes of interpersonal adjustment, wider 
identity transformation, or more complex configuration of interactions between 
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people and their social and material environment. The following paragraphs explore 
various aspects of dynamic transitions.
Perceived Ruptures
In the developmental perspective proposed here, meaning processes—whereby 
people confer sense to the situation, to their experience, or to times to come, are 
central. If changes occur, they require some sense-making; reversely, sense-making 
dynamics often follow experiences perceived as ruptures by people.
Methodologically, studies on transitions need to identify the rupture point that 
justifies their enquiry. Ruptures are often identified on the basis of an external crite-
ria, for example on the basis of unquestioned social representations (e.g., the transi-
tion to adulthood is mostly expected to be problematic), on the basis of observable 
facts (e.g., difficulties of adjustment during the school-to-work transition), or on the 
basis of other criteria defined by the researcher. Of course, sometimes, these periods 
or events are also perceived as significant by the person.
The study of ruptures and transition is a theoretical construct; yet it attempts to 
capture some phenomenological reality. If an event is studied as a rupture that is 
likely to bring a person or an organism to engage in changes, then the organism 
or the person under study must perceive the event as a rupture, in some respect. In 
other words, with other developmental psychologists, I consider that transitions to 
be studied have to follow ruptures perceived by persons (see also, van Geert, 1988; 
Wapner & Craig-Bray, 1992; Wapner & Demick, 2005).
Locating Ruptures
Whether a rupture is identified by a researcher or by the persons under study, it 
is often difficult to identify its actual, factual, objective causes. On the one hand, 
some actual causes can be very remote from the experience of the person, and what 
is actually perceived as a rupture is often a far and unpredictable repercussion of 
the initial change (e.g., as a result of war, a young woman might be exposed to 
forms of courtship that are experienced as a rupture in her identity as a woman, 
Zittoun, Aveling, Gillespie, & Cornish, in press). On the other hand, some ruptures 
are induced by processes of transitions in which the person is already engaged (e.g., 
a person might be proposed a better professional position, which generates a rup-
ture, as a result of the skills acquired during a previous transition). Additionally, if 
the researcher has often good reasons to believe that an event is a potential rupture, 
the study of individual cases reveals numerous surprises. For example, starting uni-
versity in a foreign town is often perceived as rupture, but not so much for children 
of diplomats who have changed schools and life settings regularly every few years 
during their childhood (Gyger Gaspoz, in preparation; Zittoun, 2006a). Experiences 
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of rupture do not need to be caused by a single cut event; they can also progressively 
emerge as a result of transformations of the field, such as for example when people 
have the experience of a growing ambivalence or uncertainty in their life (see e.g., 
Zittoun et al., in press).
One possible distinction among ruptures that can be perceived by a person can 
be proposed as follows. If ruptures have to do with a person’s adjustment with her 
environment, then they can be either due to a perceived mismatch between the per-
son’s ability to act or modes of thinking and the actual social, material, and symbolic 
environment, or to a perceived mismatch in her own system of understanding. In 
the first case, a person’s intending to pursue his professional activities might thus 
be confronted to the fact that he is made redundant. In the second case, a person’s 
non-violent values might be contradicted to the fact that she acted violently in a 
confrontation with a member of her family. Of course, a distant event can be the 
objective “cause” of the rupture; yet this event has to find a translation in one or more 
aspects of the person’s daily life. For example, the outbreak of a World War II could 
become a rupture for a person, not in itself, but once it caused a shortage of petrol and 
thus rendered impossible her daily activity in the family garage, and also, because it 
questioned the belief that World War I had been “a war to ends of war,” transmitted 
through the parent’s narrative (Zittoun, Cornish, Gillespie, & Aveling, 2008).
Inter- and Intra-Psychological Processes
In the light of what precedes, in order to account for psychological development, 
it is necessary to account both for intra-psychological changes and for interper-
sonal changes. Intra and interpersonal changes are usually related. It is admitted that 
Vygotsky’s work has shown how interpersonal dynamics can lead to intrapersonal 
changes (e.g., the mastery of communicative language changes modes of thinking). 
Yet the process is bidirectional: changing one’s way of thinking also changes one’s 
action in the world (Vygotsky, 1934/1997). These bidirectional changes are often 
non-linear and not strictly predictable. For example, it is not because a person takes 
German classes (interpersonal phenomenon) that she will immediately start to think 
in German (intrapersonal process); she might have to wait until she lives in a Ger-
man speaking environment, that circumstances requires from her to take an active 
role, etc., before she starts to realize that she speaks and dreams in German. The 
notions of rupture and transition thus aim at capturing both intra and interpersonal 
processes of change and their dynamic interrelations.
Processes of Transitions
In our work, we have proposed to examine systematically three interrelated transi-
tion processes: these connected with identity definition, perception or positioning, 
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these connected to learning, or also to defining new ways of acting or skills, and 
these more related to sense, values and emotions (Perret-Clermont & Zittoun, 2002; 
Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson, & Psaltis, 2003; Zittoun, 2005, 2006a; Zittoun 
et al., 2008). Doing so, we mainly want to emphasize the interrelations of dynam-
ics captured by different theoretical constructs, due to different research traditions 
studying changes. Identity dynamics have been the object of studies inspired by 
Erikson (1968), and have been approached as part of the processes of becoming a 
member in approaches primarily interested in socialization and affiliation (Lave & 
Wenger, 1991). Learning of knowledge, skills and competences is the main focus of 
studies in transitions implying moves from one formal institution to another. Issues 
of sense making in life-transitions are approached in terms of narratives (Bruner, 
1990; McAdams & Logan, 2006) or of representations of a problem or of the future 
(Masdonati, 2007). Studies of meaning are still a minority.
Note however that meaning issues have been the main interests of approaches 
studying transitions in traditional societies. These are described as relatively homo-
geneous, and as usually providing people with symbolic means to canalize changes 
and transitions: rituals and collective narrative are there to confer meaning to 
childbirth, weddings or death. In our occidental liberal societies, the abundance of 
available symbolic means paradoxically prevents people to find any ready made 
symbolic formulation of life events. This means that rendering changes and transi-
tions meaningful becomes a more personal matter. This does not mean that people’s 
need to confer sense to events has diminished. At the contrary, as a heavier demand 
is put on people who have to construct a symbolic understanding of more frequent 
life transitions, sense making processes become a key component of transitions 
processes.
A close attention to the three dynamics and their interrelations appears of great 
importance. On the one hand, it is heuristically powerful for analyzing and account-
ing for empirical facts. Hence, recent studies in vocational training show that one 
cannot understand learning and resistance to learning without a close attention to 
the identity dynamics involved (Billett, 2003). Other studies show how much these 
resistances are due to how much people can confer sense to the objects of knowledge 
(Rochex, 1998). Even more, the three aspects are constantly interrelated: knowing 
something new, questions who one is, and in turn, the meaning of the fact of being 
engaged in such learning (Hundeide, 2004; Zittoun, 2006a, 2008).
Rupture-Transitions as an Unit of Analysis: Methodological 
Challenges
The notion of transition, or more exactly, the pair rupture-transitions, is proposed as 
unit of analysis to study life trajectories, enabling to capture processes of change, 
and the person’s perspective (Zittoun et al., 2003). Transitions can thus be seen as 
processes of reorganization of a system in which people’s interpretation of a per-
ceived rupture plays a major role in their subsequent thoughts and actions.
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Perceived ruptures are not the only reasons for change and development to occur. 
Development can also occur through micro-adjustments between the person and her 
environment, as life unfolds. However, ruptures, which create sudden mismatch in 
these adjustments, appear as catalyst of processes otherwise usual. The proposed 
unit of analysis gives us a methodological tool to identify sequences of catalyzed 
change. Once this said in theoretical term, what methodological strategies enable to 
capture transitions?
In what follows, different methodological choices are presented and discussed. 
Because the main methodological challenge is to preserve the time dimension of 
psychological processes, I classify these examples on their basis of their relations 
to time. In each case, I discuss how data collection is located in relations to actual 
events; what externalization is treated as data; whether such data can be treated as 
factual information vs. reflective interpretation; and what the role of the researcher 
is. My analysis of the notion of transition in development underlines the particular 
importance of identifying ruptures perceived as such by the person. This particular 
point raises a specific technical issue: how to be sure that the transition under study 
is actually attached to a rupture perceived as such by a person? In each case, I will 
make a certain number of technical suggestions.
Reconstructive Approaches to Transition
The apparently simplest and most frequent way to document transitions is to describe 
transitions that have taken place in the past. Data are produced in the present, and 
attempts to capture some phenomenon that has already been the case—the phenom-
enon is thus reconstructed. Reconstruction is always based on forms of externaliza-
tions that have to be read in their link to some past events.
Reconstructive Interviews
One way to approach transitions in developmental trajectories is to question a per-
son, at a certain point in time, about processes and changes that have occurred in 
her past. The externalization is discourse, and it is produced in the present of the 
research. The advantage of this technique is that it offers access to the person’s 
present evaluation of past events which have appeared as ruptures. From point C, 
the person identifies events that she has personally experienced as ruptures and that 
are linked to A–B transition processes in her past. The weakness of this approach is 
that processes of change are reconstructed from the perspective of C. Consequently, 
it is not the richness of uncertain futures which are considered from the present, but 
rather the certainty from the past (Valsiner, 2008). For example, some young people 
experience moving town to start university studies as a rupture (Zittoun, 2006a). 
If they are interviewed during the transition, as they are still exploring possible 
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futures, options that could be, they evoke anxieties, might be self-contradictory, 
and express hesitations; if the transition has been experienced some time ago, their 
narration tends to emphasise the pathway that has been followed and the events that 
lead to the achieved endpoint, leaving out try-and-fail efforts leading to alternative 
routes—which, by being considered even if not followed, might have played an 
important role in the transition processes.
These reconstructions can be organized around a specific type of rupture identi-
fied either by the researcher or by the participant. For example, Mahmoud (2005) 
questioned Sudanese refugees in Egypt, the move to Egypt being expected to be 
perceived as a rupture. Other reconstructions rather offer participants to identify 
rupture or “turning points” (Leonard & Burns, 2006) in their life courses, and then 
explores these events. For my research on youth transitions, I adopted a mixed pro-
cedure: I questioned young people about a specific event likely to be experienced as 
rupture; yet I careful identified events actually experienced as such. Thus, a young 
woman interviewed on the (supposed) rupture of coming to university preferred 
to describe a major rupture she experienced earlier, the death of her grandmother 
(Zittoun, 2007b).
How much can such reconstructions capture the transition as they really occurred? 
It expects to identify on the one hand, the actual rupture-like biographical event, and 
on the other hand, the way in which the person has experienced it (Kohler, 1993). 
Yet both facts and meanings are reconstructed on the basis of memory, and as such, 
are mostly transformative reproductions of the past (Bartlett, 1920). To facilitate 
these reconstructions, externalizations made at the time of the transition might be 
useful. For example, to capture the way in which students dealt with the transitions 
due to their move to a new town, I questioned them about the objects they had taken 
with them and placed in their university room. As objects can be crystallization of 
thoughts and emotions, talking about the objects offered an indirect access to the 
thoughts and emotions characterizing the period at which the objects were chosen 
(Fuhrer, 2003; Habermas, 2001; Tisseron, 1999; Zittoun, 2006a). Similarly, when I 
interviewed adults about their transition to parenthood, I questioned them on their 
externalization during the pregnancy: the lists of first names they wrote for their 
children to come, the home-made simile of birth announcement cards, and so forth; 
on the basis of these past traces of their explorations, they could formulate some of 
their past thoughts and interpretations of events (Zittoun, 2003, 2005). On the other 
hand, the person’s interpretation of the meaning of her experience is a dynamic 
process, likely to be reconstructed through time, and transformed every time the 
person thinks back about that transition, or about any related event (unless the event 
is traumatic, in which case the meaning of the experience might be much more 
fixed, for example Abraham & Torok, 1987). The more one is interested in the accu-
racy of the actual facts, the closer these reconstructions should probably be in time. 
The memory otherwise soon becomes transformed by the interpretation (which is 
however not a problem for the researcher interested in people’s meaning making).
In such reconstructive discursive techniques, how to identify ruptures actually 
perceived by the person? Various verbal and non-verbal markers can signify a per-
son’s experience of an event as a rupture. Firstly, a person can explicitly label an 
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event as having been “eye-opening,” a “radical change,” a catastrophe, a shift—or 
any verbal expression of equivalent meaning. This is of course the simplest case: the 
person reflectively identifies in her experience such a shift with the mediation of a 
relevant semiotic mean. Second, the person might be less explicit, but might express 
or comment on a subjective past state which might be due to such rupture: follow-
ing a specific event, she had felt depressed, lost, or anxious about the future, or in a 
cloudy zone... Thirdly, the person might report past actions and externalizations that 
might have been induced by a rupture: at this time, she had been looking for informa-
tion, asking for help, seeing friends in order to discuss the situation, or alternatively, 
starting to use psychoactive substance. Fourth, the modalities of the discourse itself 
might be modified when approaching specific issues during the course of the research 
interview: the person’s debit of discourse can become slower (as when re-experienc-
ing) or faster, lower in tone (as when sad) or more excited, less fluid, or less struc-
tured (Zittoun, 2005, 2006a). A special attention to the modality of discourse and 
its flow requires a more “clinical” ear but can be developed on the basis of research 
on clinical interactions (Ammaniti & Stern, 1991; Green, 1973; Vermersch, 2006). 
Additionally, people can use para-verbal means to suggest change, such as hand ges-
tures or bodily postures. An examination of such paraverbal or non-verbal cues might 
require specific technical choices (e.g., video-recording interviews).
Within such range of means to identify perceived ruptures, only the first one 
is associated to the research participant’s clear reflective awareness of a past rup-
ture-event, in such way that it can be expressed in a linguistic form. This reflective 
awareness might be due to many factors—the person might be generally self-reflec-
tive, she might have had the occasion to discuss the events with others or to sym-
bolize them through other means than discourse (such as graphic or gestual means, 
Tisseron, 2000), or she might just articulate her experience as the research interview 
unfolds. When the person is less reflective, the researcher relies more on non verbal 
or paraverbal cues, and on his or her theoretical and empirical knowledge of the 
consequences of rupture in experience and discourse. He or she then might want 
to check his or her inferences with the person. For example, when a person, who 
usually speaks in a moderate tone, reports with great excitation the preparation of 
a trip, the researcher might question about the subjective importance of that trip. 
Of course, such an interpretative intervention usually brings the person to more 
reflectivity. To engage, or not, in such interpretation is a matter of the researcher’s 
methodological and ethical choices.
Guided Reconstructive Autobiography
The problem of reconstruction of memory becomes even more accurate when peo-
ple are questioned about a longer time span, such as in life-narrative interviews. 
Additionally to issues of memory, the very fact of turning a life experience into a 
narrative creates a very specific sort of data.
As experience is verbalised, it is deployed in time and thus becomes a narrative. One 
can construct a narrative based on events which might have appeared as disconnected 
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as they occurred. Also, narration enables the emergence of a fact which was not neces-
sarily pre-existing that narration. For example, Hasse (2002, 2008) shows how adults 
narrate their becoming the physicists they are. They mention a series of events, ran-
domly distributed in their childhood and their youth, which probably appeared as iso-
lated as they occurred. From the perspective of the present, these appear as connected 
and part of one same “transition to being a physicist”. Narration is also submission to 
canonical genres, of which the most elementary structure is that of an accident, being 
then resolved (Bruner, 1991; McAdams, 1993; Propp, 1928/1968)—narrative genres 
invite the narration of ruptures and transitions (Gillespie, 2005). In addition, narratives 
in interviews are co-constructed, and the active role of the researcher should never be 
underestimated in the production of a transition-like narrative. Finally, reconstructive 
autobiographical narrative techniques, based on language use, privilege people who 
have an easy access to verbal language as mode of symbolisation.
There are different technical tricks to circumvent these issues. As in most 
approaches in qualitative research, demultiplication of perspectives plays a key-
role (Flick, 1992). One technique consists in taking seriously in account the role of 
the interviewer, who can become a real partner in the construction of the narrative. 
For example, in adult education, guided autobiography through group discussion 
is a common technique to identify life transitions (Dominicé, 2007; West, 2006). 
In a more classical research setting, an analysis of transitions in the life-trajectory 
of a man in his seventies was produced using the following technique: the research 
project and the idea of rupture were discussed at length with that person. He was 
firstly narrating events and memories from different periods of its life. Through 
further oral questioning, other memories were proposed. Then, the man was asked 
to produce a written account of these various events. Interpretations of these as 
ruptures were then discussed with him (Zittoun, 2007a). Another type of demultipli-
cation of perspective can be obtained through techniques of collaborative research 
(Cornish, Zittoun, & Gillespie, 2007). In their interesting project called “Samisebe”, 
a group of Czech sociologists of different generations wrote each their autobiogra-
phy through the recent history of the country (Konopásek, 2000); they then dis-
cussed in group their perspectives on specific events, experienced by some of them 
as young people, by other as mature adults or already elderly people—and certain 
events being ruptures for some, and not for the others. Here, the collective memory 
confers some objectivity—or at least, some distance—to the facts; while the con-
frontation of perspectives brings to specify (if not polarize) personal interpretations. 
Finally, in autobiographical research as well, externalizations issued at the time of 
the experience might facilitate the experience. In a recent autobiographic text, Grass 
(2007) thus deplores having lost his wartime notebooks, past sketchbooks, diaries 
and collections of poems—having these, he believes, would give him a more trust-
able access to the mind of the person he once was. However, a visit to his childhood 
home town enabled him to revivify memories of the past.
In these examples, events considered as ruptures are identified reflectively. 
This identification is doubly guided. Firstly, it is always the interaction between 
the person and others—the researcher, the group of co-researchers, the students 
also engaged in a life trajectory analysis, that facilitates that process of identifying 
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ruptures: different perspectives, but also, perspectives exchanges between people 
engaged in a common project, can lead to this reflection. Indeed, these procedures 
are quite likely to bring participants to see their life stories from the perspectives 
of the other, or to apply other’s analysis on their own trajectory (Gillespie, 2007). 
Second, such projects are also mediated by semiotic resources: people analyzing 
their lives are usually explicitly looking for bifurcation, critical points, ruptures, 
etc.—and on such case the notion of bifurcation, or rupture might become semiotic 
mediators guiding the attention. More generally, culturally shared modes of nar-
rating experience might canalize a person’s narration and shape it into a canonical 
form in which transition play an important role (Bruner, 1990; Gillespie, 2005; 
McAdams & Logan, 2006).
Mediated Reconstruction
To overcome the fact that narrative reconstruction privileges people who have an 
easy access to verbal narration, these reconstructions can be mediated by alterna-
tive modes of externalisation—based on different semiotic modes—at the time of 
the research process.
The mastery of language might particularly be an obstacle for children. To over-
come this problem, Hviid (2002, 2008) asks children to draw a map of the places 
in which they live and have lived. The first mediation of their experience is thus 
graphic. For a while, it escapes to the convention and limitation of verbal language. 
Children are then asked to comment on those drawings. Verbal language completes 
or nuances the graphic reconstruction of the past. Thus, the first person perspective 
is preserved, and the complementarity of modes of externalisation (graphic, verbal) 
might enable to reconstruct the processes at stake.
Ruptures are then usually identified under specific forms, dependent on the sem-
iotic codes due to different modes of externalisations. For example, when research 
participants are asked to draw their life trajectories, they often draw lines on which 
are indicated curves or sudden change of directions; in that case, these bifurca-
tions can be questioned, and often do correspond to the participants’ perception of 
change. Metaphors of change have thus a spatial form which might be rooted in a 
more embodied perception, as often metaphors have (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).
Real-Time Transitions
The alternative to reconstructive technique for documenting transitions is real-time 
data production—or at least, attempts to do so. Here, the idea is to put in place a pro-
cedure that enables to follow the process of change as it unfolds. The main options 
for this are longitudinal, synchronic date collection, and diachronic—repeated data 
collection. One of the limits of synchronic data collection is that it might be difficult 
to ask an observer to gather data over the extended period of time that a transition 
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process might last (e.g., the 9 months of a pregnancy). Researchers therefore tend 
to effectuate repeated data collections over a certain period (see e.g., Fogel, King, 
& Shanker, 2008). One of the ways to study naturally occurring transitions consists 
in asking research participants to repeatedly report on their transitions from their 
own perspective. This then raises a second issue: doing so, a person always steps 
out of the flow of time, and thus the procedure is not synchronic anymore. The two 
methodological strategies presented below take these points in account.
Real-Time Data Production—First Person
A first series of techniques is based on people’s explication of their experience, as 
these actually unfold (or as close as this is possible). For example, one longitudinal 
technique is to question repeatedly the same individual over a period considered as 
being rich in transitions—for example the two first university years (Bell, Wieling, 
& Watson, 2005) or the ten years of youth (Henderson, Holland, McGrellis, Sharpe, 
& Thompson, 2007). This can be also combined with the collection of various exter-
nalisations—for example, asking the subjects to describe their environment, daily 
activities, or current communications (Wapner & Demick, 2005, p. 297). Within 
our theoretical framework, which admits the importance of interactions, people’s 
ability to confer meaning, the role of semiotic mediation in the acquisition of a 
reflective distance, and the constant dynamic of changes accelerated by these medi-
ated interaction, such longitudinal research enterprise necessarily participates to the 
actual changes of the person. This fact can be seen as a theoretical issue (how to 
study “real” change?) as much as an ethical one (can a researcher influence a life-
trajectory?). However, this can also be seen less as one of the constituents of the 
stuff about which psychological research is made—human interactions. Therefore, 
to be consistent with our theoretical assumptions, researchers should take this fact 
in account when producing and analysing data.
Accounting for the change induced by the research procedure in real-time data 
collection can be with different degrees. It can just be stated. It can also be deliber-
ately used, hence turning the research procedure into a research-action or a didactic 
strategy. Studying the transitions that bring people to become students in a French 
University, Coulon (2004) asked his students to write a diary of their daily difficul-
ties and understanding about their “métier” (profession) of students. Here, reflectiv-
ity was both seen as a research tool (to document the process) and a pedagogical 
tool (both to facilitate the transition taking place, and to familiarize students with 
ethno-methodology).
Of course, in some cases, the necessary accrued reflectivity might be seen as 
risking to transform too deeply the course of changes and thus the strategy has to be 
excluded for ethical reasons. For example, when I studied how people chose names 
for their children to come, I decided not to use real-time techniques. Talking to a 
third person, parents have to rationally account for their decision, or anticipate the 
reaction of the listener; yet this sort of reflective thinking differs from the logics 
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mostly governing naming procedures—during which people follow their intuition, 
listen to their dreams, or explore their fantasies. In that case, interviews might have 
radically altered the name-choice procedure. To support this point, it appeared that 
even reconstructive interviews about this procedure often brought people to see the 
name they choose in a very different light, and sometimes to question them (Zit-
toun, 2004, 2005).
In real-time data production, the researchers usually choose their subjects at 
moments in their lives in which they are likely to experience rupture and engage 
in transition processes. As in some cases of reconstructive data, events likely to 
provoke ruptures are identified on the basis of theoretical elaboration or exploratory 
work. But if researchers only examine externalizations of people during these a pri-
ori defined periods, how can they verify that these are actually engaged in transition 
processes due to experienced ruptures?
This has not been, as far as I know, the object of systematic considerations. 
However, two main techniques might be imagined and explored. On the one side, 
the researchers could compare externalization in these periods with other exter-
nalizations. They could be compared with each externalizations of other persons, 
living comparable life-events under some respect (Sato et al., 2007), so as to see 
if different types of discourse could be identified, and if the difference could be 
attributed to the fact that it follows, or not, an experienced rupture. They could 
also be compared with externalizations of the same person at different times of her 
life, to identify some qualitative changes which might be attributed to the rupture. 
On the other hand, some cues defined on a theoretical basis might actually indi-
cate that the person is engaged in a process of transition. If transitions demand the 
emergence of new modes of thinking, to define oneself, or to define new forms of 
actions, such cues might be: exploratory talk; alternance of prospective and reflec-
tive talk; indications of anxiety and insecurity, etc. In order to identify these cues, 
the actual examination of micro-transitions might be useful, as we will show in the 
next section.
Archival Approaches to Transitions
To avoid issues related to added reflectivity while following events as they unfold 
in life-trajectories, it is possible to use longitudinal data, even when produced for 
other purpose than a study on transitions. Diaries might offer such longitudinal data. 
Diaries are produced daily by people, to testify about daily events and reflection, 
and are usually addressed to a real or an imagined other (Lejeune, 2000). Unlike 
reconstructive data, the text of diaries are externalizations following quasi in real-
time (with a distance of a few hours) what people experience and how they interpret 
facts. Sometimes, diaries enable a reader to see how they diarists think about their 
past experiences, and how their interpretations of events change through time. The 
regularity of externalization also reveals, paradoxically, the alteration of daily life, 
and thus offers an excellent entry on ruptures and transitions.
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On the basis of such methodological reasoning, we engaged in a research project 
on the ruptures experienced by a young woman during World War II in England. 
Data was given by her diaries produced in the frame of the Mass-Observation 
project, launched in England at the beginning of World War II. This project asked 
people to write their diaries and send them to the project leader so as for people to 
constitute “an anthropology of ourselves” (Bloome, Sheridan, & Street, 1993). Our 
analysis comprised the daily externalizations that constitute the diary, together with 
daily newspapers and documents to which people had access at that time. We could 
thus on one side identify objective events likely to be perceived as ruptures, such as 
the declaration of war, the first bombings, or Bevin’s call inciting women to work 
on the “home-front”. We could on the other side identify, through a close analysis of 
the young woman’s writing, what events she might have actually perceived as rup-
tures, and transition processes in which she engaged (Gillespie et al., 2008; Zittoun 
et al., 2008).
To identify ruptures, we were attentive to several cues. Considering the written 
text as a form of externalization of the young woman’s flow of consciousness or 
“stream of thought” (James, 1890), we observed its alterations. For example, dur-
ing some long periods the young woman reports a few lines of short sentences in 
quite monotonous, repetitive way. In contrast, after some events, she writes long 
pages of a very dynamic discourse. Also, in these pages, there are occurrences of 
highly dialogical, reflective, and exploratory texts, which we have called “dialog-
ical knots” (Gillespie et al., 2008). These were marked by numerous reports of 
diverse interlocutors’ positions (her’s in the present and in the past, other peoples), 
changing pronouns and verbal times, explorations of real and alternative scenarios 
and their consequences, etc. Over a longer period, ruptures were also appearing 
retrospectively, for example when the young woman observed how much her life 
had changed since such and such events, or when comparing her life at anniversary 
dates to other calendar events (Zittoun, in press-a).
Micro-processes of Transitions
If we admit changes as part of complex developmental systems, any transition proc-
esses might be decomposed into more minute transitions. Reversely, studying micro-
processes of transition might highlight processes occurring not only in isolation, 
but also as part of wider transitions. As mentioned above, phenomenon at this scale 
might for example facilitate the identification of cues for wider transitions. We can 
here mention a few techniques for the collection of micro-processes of transition.
If the goal is to study naturally occurring transitions, one method consists in 
using data produced over a long period of time, to identify afterwards some events 
that might have been perceived as ruptures, and to engage in a close analysis of its 
suites. Some studies identify minute changes that happen to be part of a broader 
developmental dynamic (e.g., becoming a professional, language acquisition). For 
example, de Saint-George and Filliettaz (2008) regularly filmed young apprentices’ 
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daily manual, physical and verbal interactions in the work place. Their close analysis 
of discourse and gestures follows micro-adjustment to the newness of these situa-
tions. In a different field, Nelson and her colleagues analyzed the audio recordings 
of a little girl’s self-narration before falling asleep over a period of a few months. 
They could then engage in minute analysis of the micro-processes, or more brusque 
changes of her discourse (Nelson, 2006). Interviewing students over a period of 2 
years, Bell et al. (2005) combined their analysis of the micro-transitions occurring 
during interviews, with their analysis of changes over the whole period. Other stud-
ies become focused on ruptures of a specific type, such as “aha” moment, “prise de 
conscience,” or acquisition of reflectivity. Gillespie (2006) thus analyses interviews 
made with tourists, and focuses on moments in which the discourse reveals a change 
of perspective (e.g., leading them to realize that they behave as much as “tourists” 
than other people that they criticize) manifested by a change in the use of pronouns.
If the purpose is to understand the micro-processes of transitions, one can also pro-
voke ruptures and see how these are resolved. Some researchers thus create experi-
mental and quasi experimental setting in which they ask their participants to verbalize 
their thinking as their action unfolds. For example, Abbey and Valsiner (2004) created 
situations in which people were exposed to disrupting situations and had to speak aloud 
about how they were making sense of it. Such technique is possible only in relation to 
events decided in advance as potentially experienced as ruptures by the researcher.
From Micro to Transitions
The techniques just illustrated enable to render visible micro-processes of transi-
tions. At this scale, such processes are not always accompanied by the person’s 
sense of a rupture. However, they might lead to durable changes, either through an 
accumulation of micro-changes, or by “breaking through” and actually becoming 
cause, or part of a rupture. Also, they might play an important role in our under-
standing of real-life transitions. On a methodological plane, these close analyses 
might suggest which cues might be then used to identify ruptures and transitions 
in life trajectory data. On a theoretical plane, the study of micro-transitions might 
help to better understand what transitions are made of. Of course, when ruptures 
are induced by the researcher, then one has to question the possibility of general-
izing what is learned from observations, especially if one admits that one of the key 
aspects of ruptures is their personal significance.
Combined Methods: Accounting for Complexity
Currently, difficulties attached to one or the other techniques call mostly for a com-
bination of post-hoc and real-time data, within larger and shorter time-spans. Here, 
I mention two strategies based on the gathering of a plurality of data and their com-
bination so as to account for phenomena in their systemic complexity.
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Institutional Case Studies
Transitions in people’s lives can occur as the settings in which they live and work 
are transformed. They can also be supported by institutions. Case studies of institu-
tions thus offer rich data to analyze transitions in their sociocultural contexts. They 
can combine the analyses of a given setting of activity and its link with its context, 
of actual interactions, of key individual perspectives. Hence they can offer a frame 
to examine the relationship between intra-psychological changes and changes in 
the social world (Beach, 1999, 2003; Heath, 1996, 2004; Miles et al., 2002; Zittoun, 
2004, 2006b). For example, called to document the transformation experienced by 
teachers and students in a professional school after the introduction of a compu-
ter-controlled production unit, Perret and Perret-Clermont (2004) combined several 
types of data. Analysis of archives and official documents enabled to attest for the 
contextual socio-historical changes; video-recordings of everyday interactions ena-
bled to capture micro-processes in real-life, during which teachers and students had 
to renegotiate their respective roles and status around a new object; and interviews 
with them gave voice to their personal perception of the changes over a longer 
period.
Situated Case Studies
Similarly, case of individual changes might be apprehended more fully when a 
plurality of data and sources are combined. The most obvious way of elaborat-
ing a non institutional case-study is to start from a case which is already part 
of the public discourse and about which a plurality of data does exist. The case 
of the young woman writing a diary mentioned above is such a case; as her 
life occurred at a time of important societal events, and thanks to the fact that 
historical distance enables to identify significant information, we combined the 
first-person perspective of the diary, with the information given by other persons 
in their diaries during the same period (see also, Richards & Sheridan, 1987; 
Sheridan, Street, & Bloome, 2000), daily newspapers, scholarly researches about 
the period, and so forth. In his analysis of significant changes in the life of Mal-
colm X, Gillespie (2005) combined data given from Malcolm X’s autobiography 
with letters from his correspondence, public discourse written by him, and other 
information about him.
One could also imagine combining first person reconstructive and/or quasi 
real-time interviews with information gathered in the significant life environ-
ment of that person—interviews of significant others (e.g., families, on the work 
place), observations of daily interactions, information about the setting and its 
implicit and explicit frame for action, etc. How this information, from differ-
ent perspectives and at different levels of analysis, is then combined to give an 
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understanding of the whole that constitutes the transition under study, is then to 
be decided from case to case.
Concluding Words
This chapter proposed an exploration of available methodological strategies for 
the study of transitions in life trajectories. These strategies have been selected as 
they could respect some theoretical assumptions characterising a developmen-
tal approach, and offer solutions to certain challenges. Firstly, it is possible to 
approach the time-dimension of transitions, if one examines transitions as proc-
esses in the becoming, whose outcomes are not predicable in advance, but can be 
retraced through reconstructive techniques. Secondly, a dynamic system approach 
gives a good frame to show the mutual dependency of intra-psychological change, 
interpersonal change, and social transformation. Thirdly, the propositions made 
here had at their core the processes of meaning making in which a particular 
person is engaged. Fourthly, idiographic approaches to development enable to 
preserve the richness of data. The pair of notions rupture-transitions, offering a 
methodological unit, also might help to identify theoretically equivalent cases 
(Sato et al., 2007), and offer a middle-distance notion as a step towards generali-
sation (Zittoun, in press-b).
However, the attempt to capture a person’s meaning making in transitions has 
brought me to raise a specific technical problem: that of identifying in the data cues 
signalling that the situation under study is actually attached to a rupture perceived 
by the person. My overall proposition is to consider data as form of externalisation 
produced either as the flow of events constituting transitions following perceived 
are happening, or as an externalisation manifesting the person’s reaction as she 
is remembering such events. In both cases, the flow of the person’s externalisa-
tion—always part of her meaning making processes—is likely to be affected by the 
proximity of a personally significant rupture. Externalisation can be made through 
different semiotic modes—verbal, gestual, graphic, etc. The researchers have then 
to identify how, in the particular mode they consider, the experience of rupture is 
manifested. Hence, the key-point is to give oneself theoretical notions and meth-
odological techniques to identify cues of ruptures in a given semiotic mode. One 
the one hand, researches in other disciplines, but specialised in the modifications of 
semiotic modes, can be of great help: for example, clinical studies of discourse or 
semiotic studies of graphic representation, can provide useful indications. On the 
other hand, studies of micro-transitions might render visible the processes whereby 
dynamics of transitions are actually generated.
Once the notion of transition becomes theoretically grounded, and translated into 
non trivial methodological techniques, it can offer an entrance to a better under-
standing of dynamics of catalysed changes in life-trajectories.
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